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The Quality of Big Data. Development, Problems, 
and Possibilities of Use of Process-Generated  
Data in the Digital Age 
Nina Baur, Peter Graeff, Lilli Braunisch & Malte Schweia ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Qualität von Big Data. Entwicklung, Probleme und Chancen der 
Nutzung von prozessgenerierten Daten im digitalen Zeitalter«. The paper intro-
duces the HSR Forum on digital data by discussing what big data are. The au-
thors show that big data are not a new type of social science data but actually 
one of the oldest forms of social science data. In addition, big data are not 
necessarily digital data. Regardless, current methodological debates often as-
sume that “big data” are “digital data.” The authors thus also show that digital 
data have a big drawback concerning data quality because they do not cover 
the whole population – due to so-called digital divides, not everybody is on the 
internet, and who is on the internet, is socially structured. The result is a selec-
tion bias. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that big data and digital 
data are data like any other type of data – they have both advantages and spe-
cific blind spots. So rather than glorifying or demonising them, it seems much 
more sensible to discuss which specific advantages and drawbacks they have as 
well as when and how they are better suited for answering specific research 
questions and when and how other types of data are better suited – these are 
the questions that are addressed in this HSR Forum. 
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1. What are “Big Data”? 
In most current methodological debates, “big data” appear to be a relatively 
new phenomenon, arisen in the last two decades. Despite this seeming novelty, 
“big data” or, as they have been called in older debates, “process-produced 
mass data” (Baur 2009, 10) have been used both by scientists and non-
scientists (such as politics, pubic administration, companies, or the media) for 
more than 200 years. Early forms of big data are, e.g., census data and other 
forms of public administrative data (also: public administrational data), archiv-
al data (such as church registers), or newspaper data. These data have been 
widely used especially in Germany and other European countries for more than 
200 years, as there historically, public administrative data were developed as an 
instrument for modern administration, government, and exercising power dur-
ing modernization (Wallgren and Wallgren 2014). 
The methodological reflection on big data is as old as the use of big data for 
research. In fact, while, e.g., French sociology has just been discovering the use 
of statistics as a means of power in recent decades (e.g., Desrosières 2005, 
2011; Thévenot 2011, 2016; Salais 2012; Whiteside 2015; Amossé 2016; Beh-
risch 2016; Diaz-Bone 2016; Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016; Speich Chassé 
2016), the methodological critique of an unreflected and positivist use of big 
data in public administrative statistics (and of a positivist use of single-case 
case studies in historical sciences) was one of key incentives for founding 
German sociology: In Germany in the early 20th century, sociology was sup-
posed to be a complementary science to statistics, economics, and historical 
sciences in order to provide methodological reflection and control of an un-
thoughtful use of big data and other data (Baur et al. 2018). In the last 120 
years or so, there have been great methodological advances concerning meth-
ods of big data analysis (Baur 2009), and it cannot be stressed enough that – 
considering the amount of time invested in improving this methodology – it 
would be fruitful to ensure that this knowledge is not lost. 
So all in all, neither big data nor the methodological reflection on them are 
new. Still, this does not mean that nothing has changed. However, the changes 
have occurred in different spheres than current methodological discourses often 
imply. Namely, what is new is not the existence of big data. Rather, what is 
new is that in the last decades, the variety and accessibility of big data as well 
as the possibilities of big data analysis have largely increased. 
In order to understand these changes, it has to be acknowledged first that there 
are two types of big data with fluent boundaries: 
- Traditional-Type Big Data: The oldest form of big data are administra-
tive data which are a by-product of organizational and administrative 
processes, e.g., register data, other public administrative data, newspaper 
and other media data and companies’ customer data. Since the 1970s, 
these data have increasingly become “digital data” in the sense that they 
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have been increasingly digitalized, i.e., either directly collected by digital 
means or first collected offline and then digitalized for storage and data 
management. Since the 1990s, these data have been increasingly made 
accessible for scientific analysis, for example in Germany by implement-
ing Research Data Centres and the RatSWD. In parallel, since the 1970s, 
data have almost solely been analysed digitally, first by using classical 
statistical analysis techniques (Baur and Lamnek 2016) and recently also 
by using text mining (Manderscheid 2019a) and other big data analysis 
techniques (Riebling 2019). 
- New-Type Big Data: In addition, big data can also be a by-product of dig-
ital communication in the Web 2.0, such as web server logs and log files 
(Schmitz and Yanenko 2019), websites (Schünzel and Traue 2019), blogs 
(Schmidt 2019), social media (Schrape and Siri 2019), web videos (Traue 
and Schünzel 2019), gaming data (Bottel and Kirschner 2019), digital 
self-measurement data (Koch 2019) or Twitter, chats and other user-
generated data (Mayerl and Faas 2019; Nam 2019), geo data (Lakes 
2019), and geo tracking (Kandt 2019) as well as data created by surveil-
lance companies, wearables such as smartwatches, smart eyewear, and in 
smart houses in smart cities. In contrast to traditional types of big data, 
these new types of big data usually are a by-product of using these data in 
the internet, and data production is a lot faster than in the past – this 
property of new-type big data is called “velocity” (Lane 2001, Weichbold 
et al. 2020 – in this issue). 
If one looks at common definitions of big data, it is obvious that it is not clear 
what big data are. A property that is seen as typical for big data both in the 
discussions on traditional-type big data (e.g., Baur 2009) and on new-type big 
data (Lane 2001, Weichbold et al. 2020, in this issue) is that big data have a 
large volume. That means both that there are a lot of data and that data sets are 
large. This property is very often combined with the idea that big data do not 
contain a sample but cover the whole population and therefore sampling and 
generalization strategies are not necessary, as one already covers the full popu-
lation. Note that the latter is an idea which usually is not true in practice, and 
actually systematic exclusion of parts of the population are one of the biggest 
weaknesses of big data – a point we discuss in more detail below. 
A second property of both traditional-type big data and new-type big data is 
variety, meaning that in a given big data set, different data types are usually 
mixed: Big data sets usually consist of both qualitative and quantitative com-
ponents from a variety of data types (e.g., numerical, verbal, and visual data) 
and data sources. The result is that the data structure is very complex and in-
creases the requirements for and challenges of data analysis – and big data 
analyses are always mixed methods analyses (Baur et al. 2017). 
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All in all, big data are not a new type of data and may or may not be digital. 
If one accepts this notion, the question arises as to what the specific properties 
of new-type big data are compared to traditional-type big data. 
In this paper, we will approach this question by first discussing the history 
of big data and their various forms. We will show in more detail than in this 
brief introduction that big data are not new but actually one of the oldest forms 
of social science data – the actual methodologically relevant difference is not 
between traditional-type and new-type big data but between process-produced 
data (which may or may not be) and research-elicited data (which are rarely 
big) – and the difference is not about data size but about data quality, an issue 
that is discussed in more detail in the papers of this HSR Forum. Moreover, 
what counts as data of high quality depends on the data themselves and the 
specific application in the scientific fields (see Graeff and Baur 2020, in this 
issue). 
We will also show that big data are not necessarily digital data and that re-
search-elicited data are not necessarily non-digital. This is important because 
in current methodological debates, it is usually assumed that “big data” are 
“digital data” and that digital data have a better quality than non-digital data. 
We will therefore show, second, that digital data have a big drawback in da-
ta quality because they do not cover the whole population – due to so-called 
digital divides, not everybody is on the internet, and who is on the internet, is 
socially structured. This is methodologically important because it thus means 
that when using digital data, specific blind spots are created or specific phe-
nomena are noticed that actually do not exist (e.g., fake news, etc.). We explore 
the type of blind spots by discussing who is excluded from the internet and for 
what reasons. Since (deliberately) biased or falsely created data are hard to 
tackle and generate a huge research field on their own (Vargo et al. 2017), we 
leave these out of our considerations. 
The result of our discussion is that big data and digital data are data like 
any other type of data – they have both advantages and specific blind spots. So 
rather than glorifying or demonising them, it seems much more sensible to 
discuss, which specific advantages and drawbacks they have as well as when 
and how they are better suited for answering specific research questions and 
when and how other types of data are better suited – these are the questions that 
are addressed in this HSR Forum. We thus conclude by introducing the papers 
of this forum. 
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2. The History of Big Data 
2.1  The Invention of Big Data as a Tool of Power during 
Modernisation 
The history of big data starts with public administrative data, especially census 
data. Depending on how much one wants to go back in time, one could start 
telling the history of big data beginning with the ancient world when ancient 
governments tried to do censuses for administrative planning, e.g., in order to 
assess how many taxes they could raise, how many people they could recruit 
for the military and how many crops to plant. For example, one of the first 
censuses was conducted in Babylon around 3,800 BC and in Egypt around 
3,000 to 2,000 BC. 
Alternatively, one could start the history of big data with the invention of 
modern bureaucracy between the 16th and 18th century during the times of 
absolutism and cameralistics (Kameralistik) in Europe and especially in Prussia 
(which was a part of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”). 
During this time, first, the variety of data collected increased: While gov-
ernments had been continuously collecting census data since antiquity, now 
other government agencies started collecting data, too. For example, the police 
started collecting crime statistics. When social security systems were invented, 
each so-called social security agency started collecting data on their recipients. 
Companies were legally required to regularly report firm statistics in order to 
be able to calculate a country’s productivity and so on. In parallel, economic 
actors and NGOs started collecting data as well; e.g., each company typically 
collects data on their customer, for every order that is placed. Another tradi-
tional type of big data are news, because each newspaper regularly produces 
whole volumes of data. 
Second, fiscal accounting became an internal part of modern administration. 
According to Max Weber, the discovery of modern fiscal accounting and sys-
tematic use of data is an essential condition for the development of modern 
capitalism (Collins 1980). So, around 1800, modern states discovered public 
administration and started using not only census data but also other types of 
data for collecting information on both their citizens and their economy in 
order to assess how their societies worked. From now on, modern states had 
two main sources of power: the military and big data. Thus, big data were 
consolidated as a tool of power and dominion in the competition of nations. In 
addition to volume and variety, this is the third property that traditional-type 
and new-type big data share: They have value. While in the past this value 
became visible when big data were utilized by sovereign states as an instrument 
of power, the value of new-type big data is much more tangible in the form of 
companies’ financial resources that can be sold. 
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Third, in the 1800s, governments not only started to collect big data more 
systematically but they always also invented statistics as a science in order to 
analyse these big data and to use this power source even more effectively. In 
contrast to other sciences (again especially in the German-language context), 
statisticians were typically closely related to the government. What was typical 
for statistics of that time was that many statisticians believed that these data 
were “real” in so far as they gave an “objective” image of society – a miscon-
ception that can be found in current debates on big data, too. 
As can be seen from this historical overview, big data are a very old data 
type and one of the oldest data types used in the social sciences. For example, 
Friedrich Engels’s (1845) study on the British working class, Émile Durk-
heim’s (1897) suicide studies, and Max Weber’s (1906-1922) study on the rise 
of modern capitalism all heavily relied on analysing big data. In the beginning, 
big data were always produced as analogous data, but since the 1970s, when 
computer sciences started first administering and analysing these data, big data 
have been increasingly digitalized, and in the recent decades these data are 
increasingly produced digitally, also. Thus, with traditional-type big data, one 
cannot always say clearly if they are analogous or digital data because there 
might have been a switch in data production in the course of their history. 
Moreover, as the case of newspapers illustrates, traditional-type big data might 
be simultaneously digital and analogous, as most modern newspapers still have 
a printed version but provide the same information online. 
2.2 Social Theory and Social Science Methodology as 
Countermeasures against Big Data Quality Issues 
What is important for social science methodology is that in the 19th century, 
big data were the most commonly used data type used in analyses of societies, 
and most statisticians believed that these data provide a “true” and “objective” 
image of reality. This belief in the objectivity of big data is shared by many 
current scholars in the field of new-type big data and is called “validity.” The 
belief is that big data cover the full population without any distortions or errors 
which also means that sampling is not necessary. 
However, as the long methodological discourse on big data has proven over 
and over again, this is a misconception (for a summary, see Baur 2009): In 
contrast to common belief, big data typically do not cover the full population. 
Instead, (a) depending on which institution collects data according to which 
rules, and also (b) depending on how the persons data are collected on react to 
data collection (e.g., nonresponse, purposefully wrong answers, etc.), big data 
are typically characterized both by biased samples and lack data quality (Bick 
and Müller 1984). The institutional selection bias especially often results in 
huge differences between the target population and the sampling population 
(Baur 2009). For example, what governments usually want to know about their 
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population is something about their whole population, but what they usually are 
actually able to collect data on is the resident population. In the case of Germa-
ny, several groups of people are not covered by census data, such as people 
illicitly living in Germany or Germans who live outside the country. Very 
often, only citizens are covered in census data (Wallgren and Wallgren 2014, 
131ff.). Therefore, even if one uses census data, they will not contain data on 
all people living in a given territory. In addition, the groups covered by a coun-
try’s census may change from census to census. Finally, data collection (espe-
cially of big data) always takes some time – and during this time, the popula-
tion may change. Therefore, the actual meaning of “full population” must be 
defined in advance. 
It is therefore no surprise that early social science research pointed out that 
all data (including big data) are socially constructed (Baur et al. 2018). Similar 
to surveys, when constructing sets of big data, by selecting a specific target 
population, specific persons are excluded from the data set. By asking specific 
questions, concepts are measured in a specific way. For example, Thorvaldsen 
(2009) shows for Scandinavia that there are about five different measurement 
concepts on how to measure ethnicity and, depending on which concept is 
used, the size of each ethnic group will vary widely. 
Despite the obvious sampling and data quality issues of big data, similar to 
popular belief today especially in computational social sciences, 19th century 
statisticians typically believed that big data provided an objective and complete 
image of society – a notion that was strongly criticized by early German soci-
ologists. More precisely, the criticism of an unreflected use of big data was one 
of the main reasons for the founding of German sociology (Baur et al. 2018). 
More specifically, the “Verein für Socialpolitik” was founded in 1873, fol-
lowed by the “German Sociology Foundation” (“Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Soziologie,” DGS) in 1909. German sociologists criticised both statistics and 
historical science of their time. Their main argument was that data do not speak 
for themselves. Because data are constructed, they need to be reflected – if 
researchers do not reflect the construction process of data, they adopt and repli-
cate existing power structures in the field in their research. Instead, researchers 
need to use both social theory and social science methodology for reflecting 
these data and for assessing how data are distorted (Baur 2005, 24-38). The 
newly-founded discipline of sociology aimed at being a complementary science 
which was supposed to provide both statistics and historical science with theo-
ry and methodology in order to learn how to assess data quality and handle data 
properly (Baur 2008; Baur et al. 2018). 
Early social science methodology explored two paths in handling data quali-
ty issues of big data: one was developing a data lore for big data (Bick and 
Müller 1984) which aimed at assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
big data (see Graeff and Baur 2020 in this issue for more detail). 
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One of the main disadvantages of process-generated data was that research-
ers could not control the process of data production and therefore had to live 
with whatever blind spots the data had (Baur 2009). Therefore, the second 
strategy of early social science methodology was encouraging social scientists 
to collect their own data – the so-called research-elicited data. Research-
elicited data typically have errors, too. However, in contrast to process-
produced data, researchers can control which types of errors occur and thus 
better reflect and handle them methodologically. 
Building on this idea, there have been some methodological innovations in 
the early 20th century. For quantitative research, the two most important inno-
vations were first of all, inventing research-induced data collection, such as 
“enquêtes” (Enquêten) and surveys (standardisierte Befragung). 
Innovations on sampling strategies soon followed, the most important sam-
pling innovation in quantitative research being the invention of random sam-
pling in the 1930s – for this methodological innovation, the market research 
institution “Gallup” was especially historically important: In 1936, the US 
magazine, “The Literary Digest,” tried to sample the full population of its about 
2,000,000 readers. Using these big data, the magazine predicted that Alf Lan-
don would win the presidential election. In contrast, George Gallup randomly 
sampled only 50,000 people and predicted that Franklin D. Roosevelt would 
win the election which proved to come true. 
These methodological tools for research-elicited data collection and sam-
pling were improved in the next decades, and both data collection and sampling 
techniques were more and more improved, but also the error lore was more and 
more refined. Since then, the discussion on research-elicited data has been 
dominating social science methodology. While for large parts of the 20th cen-
tury quantitative social research was used to discuss various errors that could 
arise from research-induced data separately in various disciplines, the turn of 
the 21st century saw quantitative social science research having integrated all 
these ideas into the concept of the “survey life cycle.” The different concepts of 
errors were integrated into the concept of the “total survey error” (TSE; Baur 
2014). 
What is important to stress in the context of debates on big data is that, in 
current debates, research-elicited data and sampling are sometimes stylized as a 
“problem.” However, in fact, when they were developed, they were meant as a 
solution to the obvious drawbacks of big data and other process-generated data. 
2.3  The Resurgence of Big Data since the 1960s 
Because research-elicited data could be methodologically controlled and re-
flected, they had some obvious advantages concerning data quality and sam-
pling. However, it was mostly due to the different kinds of research questions 
social scientists were interested in the early 20th century (Scheuch 1977) that 
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research-elicited data slowly replaced process-generated data as the dominant 
data type in social science research between the 1930s and 1950s. In the post-
war period, social scientists hardly ever used process-generated big data any 
more (Baur 2005, 38-45; Baur 2009, 10). However, since the 1970s, big data 
started resurging as a source of social science research due to a number of 
developments (Baur 2009, 10-11): 
1) Paradigm Shift within Theory: Within some research fields, research 
questions (Bick and Müller 1984, 125-126) and theoretical approaches 
shifted. While there was a time in the 1970s and 1980s when rational 
choice theory dominated social science discourse and individual persons 
were the typical unit of analysis in social science research, social scien-
tists in recent decades have been increasingly interested in institutions, 
organizations, and long term social change. Especially for longitudinal 
questions, process-produced data often are the only option, as no re-
search-elicited data exist for many research questions – simply, because 
no-one thought the question important enough 30 years ago to collect da-
ta on it (Baur 2004, 2005). 
2) Paradigm Shift within Methodology: In some research fields there has 
been a paradigm change in methodology. Examples are sociology of de-
viance and economic sociology. In these fields, due to the nature of the 
research problem, it is hard to collect very good research-elicited data. 
For example, in sociology of deviance, usually people who are deviant 
will hesitate to admit this in surveys. In fields like economic sociology, 
the typical unit of analysis is not an individual person but a company or 
market, making it difficult to work quantitatively. Historically, these re-
search fields had been dominated by qualitative research. However, since 
the 1960s, they, too, increasingly tried to work quantitatively (Bick and 
Müller 1984, 125-126). Due to the nature of the research question, in 
these fields, quantitative data are usually big data, resulting in a strong 
orientation towards either mixing different types of process-produced da-
ta (Baur 2011) or mixing process-produced data with qualitative re-
search-elicited data (Baur and Hering 2017). 
3) Development of IT: While shifts in social theory and social science meth-
odology provided the need for using big data again, other developments 
provided the opportunity, the first one being the enormous advances in IT 
since the 1960s. The invention of computers facilitated data management 
and made preparation and data analyses of large-scale administrative data 
possible for a broad range of researchers, which would not even have 
been thinkable 60 years ago (Baur 2005). In addition, data that had to be 
originally collected analogously could now increasingly be collected 
digitally (Seysen 2009). This is true not only for public administrative da-
ta but also for survey data, as the development of computer-aided and 
mobile survey methods in the recent decades illustrate. 
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4) Data Ownership and Reflexion of Data as a Power Source: Due to the 
increasing democratization of society, the questions of whether govern-
ments (and other institutions) may use data as a tool of power and who 
actually owns data have received public attention. This is especially true 
for Germany, which has suffered from two regimes (Nazi Germany and 
the GDR) that misused big data for controlling the population, identify-
ing persons who were “undesirable” from the point of view of the regime 
in order to imprison them and – in the case of Nazi Germany – killing 
them off (Korte 2004). Thus, since the 1960s, the main question in the 
(German) debate has been: Who owns the data? Since then, there have 
been two contrasting lines of argument. 
a. Data Privacy: The first line of argument is that the people whom 
data are collected on are the owners of the data, having a right to da-
ta privacy and informational self-determination (informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung; Mühlichen 2019). The idea is that, for example, 
it should be a person’s own right to decide by themselves if anyone 
else can collect data on their age, income, and so on. Similarly, 
companies should be able to decide by themselves which business 
information they want to reveal and which they do not want to re-
veal. This results in the demand for strong data privacy, i.e., that 
each individual person and company should have the right to decide 
which data are collected and stored on them and which data they 
want to reveal. Note that there is an implicit conflict between indi-
vidual persons’ and companies’ interests here, which is rarely dis-
cussed in data ownership discourses but has been becoming increas-
ingly important with new-type big data: Individuals might have 
information on other persons or companies, e.g., when this infor-
mation is relational, as is the case with friendships or customer data 
– it is unclear whom the data belong to in this case. 
b. Open Data: The second line of argument contradicts this viewpoint 
and argues that, first, the state needs to collect data for effective pol-
icymaking and public planning and that, second, the general public 
has a right to be informed, e.g., about dubious business practices or 
criminal individuals. Third, the social sciences and other disciplines 
need data, too, in order to do research – which is why there is a 
strong demand that all data should be open data. 
As can be seen from these lines of argument, there is a clear and irrecon-
cilable conflict of interests between these perspectives. In the German 
context, this conflict of interest has been framed as a conflict between 
“the state” and “the public” on the one hand and “research subjects,” i.e., 
individual people, on the other hand. This conflict was mediated by intro-
ducing legislation as early as the 1980s: The interests of research subjects 
are typically protected by data protection laws (Datenschutz; RatSWD 
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2017a). In addition, there is a strong debate on research ethics in the so-
cial sciences (RatSWD 2017b). As data privacy does not only address da-
ta collection but also archiving, data management, and data analysis, the 
debate on archiving and on data privacy are closely linked, resulting in 
quantitative social science methodologists developing procedures for be-
ing able to store and re-analyse sensitive data without compromising data 
privacy as early as the 19670s (RatSWD 2018). 
5) Accessibility: Public administrations started making data easily accessi-
ble for a broad range of researchers. Examples in Germany are data made 
available by institutions such as the Federal Statistical Office, the Re-
gional Statistical Offices, and so-called Research Data Centres. In order 
to improve the availability of big data, even an own council, the 
RatSWD, was created, and a series of workshops was introduced in order 
to train students and researchers how to use these data, which today are 
often already prepared for data analysis by the data-providing institution. 
6) Methodological Reflexion of and Data Lore for Big Data: In the 1970s, 
the increased accessibility and use of big data in social science research 
led to a resurgence of methodological debates on how big data can be 
used in social science research, resulting in a refined data lore by the 
1980s (Bick and Müller 1984) in order to assess the quality of big data – 
an issue that Graeff and Baur explore further in this forum of Historical 
Social Research. Large parts of this ongoing debate have been discussed 
in this journal as well as in the publications of RatSWD. 
3.  Methodological Properties of Big Data, or: 
What is New in New-Type-Big Data? 
To sum up, big data are not a new data type at all but instead probably the 
oldest type of data used in social science analysis. Therefore, there is also a 
long tradition of reflecting on the properties as well as strengths and weakness-
es of big data in social science methodology. From this discourse, what do we 
know about big data? 
First, big data are just data in the sense that – like any data – they have 
strengths and weaknesses. As not only big data but all data are faulty in some 
way, the question of whether or not big data are suitable for research cannot be 
clarified once and for all on a general level but depends both on the specific 
type of big data used and on the research question – and can only be answered 
in comparison to other data types available. Two further prerequisites for using 
specific types for data for answering a specific research question are that (a) 
data have to exist at all and (b) researchers can gain access to these data (Baur 
2009). 
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Second, big data are a subtype of process-produced data (also: process-
generated data, natural data). Process-produced data are by-products of social 
processes and produced for specific purposes, e.g., public administrations han-
dling their clients or companies managing their relationships to their customers. 
In contrast, research-elicited data (also: research-induced data) are specifical-
ly produced by social scientists for research purposes, and there are two sub-
types of research-elicited data: Primary data are collected by the same re-
searchers who analyse the data. Alternatively, researchers can re-analyse data 
that were collected by other researchers in secondary data analysis (Baur 2009). 
No data (regardless or whether they are process-produced or research-elicited) 
give a “true,” “objective” image of social reality (Baur et al. 2018). Instead, 
there is always a difference between social reality and data concerning two 
aspects (Baur 2009): 
- Sampling: The target population is usually never fully represented in the 
data – instead, the data set represents a sample. How well the sample rep-
resents the population depends on how the selection process was orga-
nized and biased – and knowing the selectivity of the data in turn influ-
ences if and how results drawn from specific data can be generalized. 
When producing research-elicited data, scholars typically define a target 
population and select cases by either random sampling or purposeful 
sampling. By controlling the process of case selection, scholars can as-
sess which types of cases are selected and which are not, or in other 
words, which sampling errors might occur. In contrast, for process-
produced data, cases are selected, too. However, the logic for case selec-
tion follows the institutional needs – when using these data, researchers 
have to live with whatever selectivities are created by this. For example, 
the German Institute for Employment Research (iab) possesses very large 
data sets which are a by-product of administering the social security data 
of employees. However, this data set does not contain any data on self-
employed persons who account for about 10% of all employees in Ger-
many (Maier and Ivanov 2018, 14) and are a very distinct group of the 
working population. Depending on the specific research question, this 
may or may not be a problem – the methodologically important point is 
that researchers have no control over the distortion of samples of process-
generated data. 
- Data Collection: The same is true for data collection. When collecting 
research-elicited data, researchers control the process of data collection 
and therefore not only can try to minimize measurement errors but – as 
some errors are unavoidable – also do usually know what types of errors 
are produced. In contrast, with process-produced data, the data producing 
institution decides what type of data to collect and also which measures 
of quality control to take. Again, scholars using these data have to live 
with whatever information is collected. 
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According to Bick and Müller (1984), the selectivities and blind spots on pro-
cess-produced data are not errors because it is not the data-producing institu-
tions’ fault that their needs might not fit the needs of social scientists. Still, 
when using process-generated data, social scientists need to reflect the specific 
properties of these data – a process Bick and Müller (1984) called “data lore” 
(Datenkunde) in contrast to the “error lore” (Fehlerkunde) that is used for re-
flecting research-elicited data (see also Graeff and Baur 2020, in this issue). 
Third, big data can be distinguished from other types of process-produced 
data by their volume. While there are many examples of small-volume process-
generated data (e.g., historical documents, pieces of art, autobiographies, archi-
tecture etc.) big data are usually mass data, that is, similarly structured, pro-
cess-produced data in very large quantities such as administrative records. 
Traditionally, both quantitative research-elicited data and big data have been 
analysed using classical statistical analysis techniques (Baur and Lamnek 
2016). Since the 1970s, more and more complex statistical procedures as well 
as new techniques such as corpus linguistics and quantitative content analysis 
(which all relied on the heavy use of computers) could be used. In recent years, 
analysis techniques such as text mining (Manderscheid 2019) and other big 
data analysis techniques (Riebling 2019) became accessible for social scien-
tists, too. 
Fourth, big data are usually mixed data – they typically combine a variety of 
data types. For example, a public record may contain a written letter or a pho-
tograph, or a social media entry may contain log file data, comments, and pic-
tures. Big data analysis therefore usually is mixed methods analysis. 
Fifth, big data have always been a means of power and dominion – they al-
ways had value. 
Sixth, big data may or may not be digital. This is important because in cur-
rent methodological discourses, big data are often confused with digital data, a 
point we will come back to in the next chapter. 
All these properties characterize both traditional and new-type big data. 
Therefore, the question arises what is actually new with new-type big data. We 
argue that – in contrast to common social science discourse – these are actually 
only four properties: 
1) Shift of Power Balances from the State to MNCs: In comparison to tradi-
tional-type big data, the process of data production and data ownership 
have changed. While public administrative data were most often pro-
duced by government agencies, and citizens often had to be forced to 
provide data, the new-type big data are typically collected by large Mul-
tinational Corporations (MNCs). Currently, most of these companies are 
US-American companies (such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter). This 
has led to a shift of power balances between the state and companies, 
placing data production outside of the control of the nation state. This is 
in so far an unresolved problem because traditional data protection laws 
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and ethical rules are bound by the rules of the nation state and aim at 
keeping the state in check – and not companies. 
2) Shift of Power Balances from Citizens/Customers to MNCs: At the same 
time, the power balances between individual people and companies have 
shifted. While in the past, citizens often needed to be forced to provide 
data to government agencies, today, as customers, they seem to be much 
more willing to provide even very sensitive personal data to companies. 
However, it is unclear, if this is really willingness or unawareness of how 
much information they actually reveal. For example, most smartphone 
apps automatically collect geo data and mobile data, meaning everybody 
who has a smartphone and does not disable the tracking function will 
continuously be monitored. Similarly, many new technologies in public 
and private spaces unobtrusively collect data. Examples are surveillance 
cameras, wearables such as smartwatches and smart eyewear, or the 
technologies engrained in smart houses in smart cities. In addition, cus-
tomers often do not have a choice, i.e., they have to reveal their data, if 
they want to use the technology, even if these data are not necessary for 
the technology to function. As many of these technologies have become 
de-facto infrastructures, customers do not have a choice but to “agree” to 
reveal their data; e.g., in many contexts, Skype, Facebook, or What’s 
App have become necessary for business and personal communication – 
if one refuses to use these technologies, one cannot do business or is ex-
cluded from social networks. All in all, while digitalization seemingly 
promises democratization, it in fact has decreased citizens’ control over 
their own data (Traue 2020). 
3) Velocity: Data production is a lot faster than in the past – this property of 
new-type big data is called “velocity” (Lane 2001; Weichbold et al. 2020, 
in this volume). 
4) Digital Data: While traditional-type big data may or may not be digital, 
new-type big data are always digital data. From the point of view of so-
cial sciences, what is really new about the Web 2.0 and new-type big data 
is that society itself is changing due to digitalisation and mediatisation, 
but at the same time the patterns of digitalisation and mediatisation are 
structured by society. This is not a methodological issue but these new 
patterns of digitalisation and mediatisation might actually influence the 
way data are produced. Meaning, there might be a recursive relation be-
tween digitalisation of society and analysing digital data, which might be 
partly linked to the velocity of data production. What is more important 
from a methodological point of view is that – because they are digital da-
ta – all new-type big data (and the digital traditional-type big data) share 
the specific selectivities of digital data, which in social science discourse 
have been discussed via the label “digital divides” (digitale Spaltungen). 
We will examine these specific selectivities and how they influence data 
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quality of big data in the next section. Note that, in addition, specific 
forms of new-type big data (such as web videos vs. log files) may have 
additional selectivities. 
4.  Digital Divides and Data Quality of New-Type Big Data 
Some discourses in computational social sciences suggest that new-type big 
data are “better” than research-elicited data because they are supposed to cover 
the “full population” and thus make sampling obsolete. This assumption is 
simply false. What these debates forget is that even today, not everybody or 
everything is “on the internet” or using digital devices. There are many people 
who, and aspects of social life which, do not leave any digital traces at all and 
therefore are not reflected in new-type big data. Similar to coverage and nonre-
sponse errors in survey research, this would be irrelevant, if it was random who 
does or does not use the internet. However, like with coverage and nonresponse 
errors, the contrary is true: Internet usage is socially structured, and some peo-
ple are systematically excluded from internet usage. This social structure of 
internet (non)usage is called “digital divides” (digitale Spaltungen) in sociolog-
ical discourse, and it implies that – like other process-generated and research-
elicited data – new-type big data do not give a complete, “true,” “objective,” or 
“representative” image of society or the world but are actually systematically 
distorted. In order be able to assess how new-type big data are biased, we dis-
cuss in this chapter (1) the extent and patterns of digital divides in order to 
assess who is (not) using the internet in order to assess the extent of possible 
errors when using new-type big data as well as (2) possible reasons for exclu-
sion from the internet and (3) different ways of using the internet in order to 
assess how and why data are biased. 
4.1  Extent and Patterns of Digital Divides: Who is (Not) Using the 
Internet? 
Internet usage has increased fast in the last two decades: While only about 17% 
of the world population used the internet in 2005, in 2019, 54% of the world 
population were “online” (ITU 2019a, 1). However, this means that even today, 
in contrast to common sense, not everybody is on the internet. On the contrary: 
Almost half of the world population is still offline, i.e., they do not leave any 
type of digital traces. 
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Graph 1: Digital Divides on a Global Scale: Global Rates of Offliners (2019): 46% 
 
Source: ITU 2019a, 2. 
 
Moreover, the rate of non-usage is not evenly distributed around the globe 
(Graph 1): In the Anglo-Saxon states (U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand), 
Western and Northern Europe, and in Russia, somewhere between 75 and 
100% of the overall population are online. The rates are slightly lower in Latin 
America. In Asia, the Pacific, and the Arab countries, only about half of the 
population uses the internet. In contrast, in Africa, more than 80% of the popu-
lation are offline (ITU 2019a, 2; 2019b). This global pattern seems to be at 
least partly connected to economic development and postcolonial structures, as 
in 2019, 87% of the population of developed countries but only 50% of the 
population of developing countries had internet access (ITU 2019b). 
However, even within countries, there are huge regional disparities in inter-
net access as well as urban-rural divides. A good example is Germany, where 
as a rule of thumb, the urban population is well connected while residents in 
less densely populated rural areas are not so well connected (BMVI 2017). This 
is not a small matter, as about one third of the German population lives in 
communities with less than 20.000 inhabitants. 
Moreover, digital divides are socially structured along the dimensions of so-
cial inequality we already know from other social phenomena. In general, one 
can say that younger people, better educated people, members of higher social 
classes, and – especially in countries with strong gender inequalities – men are 
much more likely to use the internet than other parts of the population (for 
Germany, see, e.g., Initiative D21 1919; 2020a; 2020b). 
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Rates of digitalisation become even lower, if one takes into account, that no 
one is using the whole internet. Instead, people might use different devices 
(computers, smartphones, etc.) and different parts of the internet, ranging, e.g., 
from email, simple searches, using social media, or complex usage patterns. 
For example, for Germany, different types of internet users can be identified. 
One user type is officially “online” because they typically own either a 
smartphone or a computer. However, their internet usage typically does not 
exceed making a phone call or conducting a simple search via a search engine. 
They typically do not use social media, online payment, or streaming. These 
minimal-users together with the offliners comprised about one third of the 
German population in 2019, which on a world scale is a highly digitalized 
country. In addition, while usage rates have been largely increasing in the last 
decade, the proportion of this group has been more or less stagnating for a 
couple of years (Initiative D21 1919; 2020b). 
So all in all, internet usage is not only socially structured but mostly follows 
similar patterns we know from other social phenomena, meaning that those 
groups of the population who are typically disadvantaged in other spheres of 
social life are also typically excluded from the internet: The person most un-
likely to be on the internet is an elderly uneducated lower-class woman in rural 
Africa. This is methodologically important because this means, that currently, 
new-type digital data can be used for analysing patterns of using the internet, 
but they are only partly useful for analysing the offline, non-digital world. 
Digital data are especially not suitable for any types of research question where 
social inequality may play a role because they do not cover the most disadvan-
taged groups of society. This also means that they are at not or only partly 
suitable for many sociological research questions: The whole point of sociolo-
gy is that different social groups also differ in typical behaviour, i.e., one can-
not simply assume that – if members from one social group behave in a typical 
way – members of other social groups will behave in a similar way. If the so-
cial sciences use digital data without reflecting this bias in the data, they will 
replicate global power structures and miss especially the lifeworlds of the 
Global South and most disadvantaged parts of the population. This also points 
to the need for learning more about how digital data are biased. 
4.2  Reasons for Exclusion from the Internet 
In order to properly assess how digital data are biased, it is not only important 
to know who is excluded from the internet but also why they are excluded. 
Similar to reasons for survey nonresponse (Engel et al. 2004, 1-7, 24-32, 87-96; 
Baur 2006; Baur and Florian 2008), the reasons for exclusion might be linked 
with other typical behaviours of the same person. For example, if the reason for 
being offline is poverty, the respective person might also not be able to afford 
many other, even more essential things in life – this would be especially im-
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portant to know in a study on consumption. In contrast, if a person is offline 
because of data privacy issues, this might be especially important in studies on 
internet data privacy. 
In addition to complete non-usage, it is important to know how the persons 
who are online use the internet because, as stated above, not everybody uses 
the internet in the same way – and thus does not leave the same type of digital 
traces. This in turn will mean that specific digital platforms will also only grasp 
very specific aspects of social reality. 
So the first question to ask is who has access to internet or rather: fast inter-
net, because a lot of services will only work if you have 3G or higher mobile 
standards. During the time from 2007 to 2019, the number of people with ac-
cess to internet has increased from about 5.5 billion people to almost 7 billion 
people, which is currently a large part of the world population, who in theory 
would be able to access the internet. In addition, the number of people having 
access to at least 3G is almost as high (ICT 2019a, 8). In other words, while 
there is still some regional variation following the patterns described above 
(ICT 2019a, 9), today, almost the whole world population could access fast 
internet, so this cannot be the main reason for exclusion from the internet any-
more. 
Even if one in theory has access to the internet, one still needs digital devic-
es like smartphones, notebooks, computers, and so on in order to get access to 
the internet. On a worldwide scale, little information is at hand because only 
worldwide averages are available which say little about the regional and social 
distribution of devices. However, what can be said on a worldwide scale is that 
smartphones and other cellular phones today are the main way of accessing the 
internet (ICT 2019b). When looking at specific countries, there are more de-
tailed data available which help to differentiate the image. In Germany, a coun-
try with relative high accessibility on a worldwide scale, one can see that in 
2019 – although the numbers have been decreasing in recent years – only four 
in five people had smartphones and two in three had a notebook or laptop. The 
proportion of desktop users has declined to about half of the population, the 
proportion of users of simple mobile phones has decreased to about 28% of the 
population, and the number of tablet users is stagnating at about a third of the 
population. Only 28% of the German population use Smart TV, and only 7% 
use wearables (Initiative D21 2020b, 20). This means that the type of applianc-
es accessible to people varies widely. While some people might have several 
appliances, others have only a specific point of access (Initiative D21 2020a; 
2020b). Because some digital platforms need a specific device for functioning, 
this in turn means that due to lack of this specific device, people will not have 
access to these specific services. 
A common way of getting access to the internet is during work. However, 
not everybody is employed, and only some people will get access to these 
devices while they work. For example, in Germany in 2015, only about two in 
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five employers gave their employees access to collaboration tools, like working 
together with others in documents, telephone conferences, home offices, or 
VPN for homeworking or mobile working. Only one in three employers gave 
their employees access to a smartphone or the possibility of videoconferences, 
one in five employers allowed smartphones to be integrated into the company 
infrastructure, only one in six employees worked with tablet PCs and one in 
three employees did not have any of these usages of devices or systems at work 
(Initiative D21 2016, 44-49). Moreover, there is a strong gender division of 
labour, because only one in five men but two in five women did not have any 
of these ways of access to digital devices at work (Initiative D21 2016, 44-49; 
2020a). A reason for this gender-division of internet usage at work could be 
that occupations themselves are gendered. One can only assume that occupa-
tions that are stereotyped as “male” occupations make use of the internet more 
strongly than “female” occupations. This is a problem for general internet 
usage because many people gain skills in using the internet at work. If people 
do not use the internet at work, they will not get this experience and might use 
the internet less in general (Kirchner 2015). In addition, the internet usage 
patterns differ depending on, if one uses the internet at work or at home. 
The third barrier to accessibility to the internet are literacy and language – if 
one cannot read or understand the content, one cannot use it. It is therefore 
important to keep in mind that on a worldwide scale, 14% of the population are 
illiterate. Again, strong gender, age, and regional effects can be observed: 10% 
of men and 17 % of women as well as 32% of persons aged 65 years and older 
are illiterate. In many parts of mid-Africa, literacy rates are well below 50%, 
and in India, they are also lower than 70% (UIS 2017). 
Even if they can read, many people cannot access internet content due to 
language barriers. As Table 1 reveals, while only 15% of the world population 
can speak English, 59% of the internet content is in English. The language 
barriers become most explicit in comparison to Mandarin Chinese which is also 
spoken by 15% of the world population but represents only 1% of the internet 
content. Other languages overrepresented are Russian, German, Japanese, 
Turkish, Persian, Italian, and Polish, while especially languages spoken in 
China and India as well as Arabic are underrepresented. 
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Table 1: Languages Spoken vs. Languages of Internet Content on a World 
Scale 
Language Speakers (% of World Population) Internet Content
English 15% 59% 
Mandarin Chinese 15% 1% 
Hindi 8% 
Spanish 7% 4% 
French 4% 3% 
Arabic 4% 
Bengali 3% 
Russian 3% 8% 
Portuguese 3% 2% 
Indonesian 3% 
Urdu 2% 
German 2% 3% 




Western Punjabi 1% 
Wu Chinese 1% 
Tamil 1% 
Turkish 1% 3% 
Persian 3% 
Vietnamese 1% 1% 
Italian 1% 
Polish 1% 
Note: The languages spoken do not only include native speakers but total usage in 2019, i.e., 
also those persons who have learned the language as a second language. A person can speak 
several languages. The percentages are calculated based on Ethnologue (2020) divided by an 
estimated world population of 7.7 billion persons. Source for languages of the internet in 
2020: W3Techs 2020. Empty cells = percentage less than 1%. 
 
Another barrier to use the internet is the lack of competence and the knowledge 
to use the internet. On a worldwide scale, a considerable lack of knowledge in 
even basic ITC skills can be observed: 
In 40 out of 84 countries for which data are available, less than half the popu-
lation possesses basic computer skills such as copying a file or sending an e-
mail with an attachment. For more complex activities (classified as ‘standard 
skills’), such as using basic arithmetic formulae in a spreadsheet or download-
ing and installing new software, the proportions are even lower. In 60 of the 
countries for which data are available, these proportions are below 50 per 
cent. With respect to advanced computer skills, in only two countries (United 
Arab Emirates and Brunei Darussalam) do more than 15 per cent of people re-
port having written a computer programme using a specialized programming 
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language in the last three months. In only 10 other countries is that proportion 
above 10 per cent. Although more data need to be collected, these results 
show that there is a strong need to develop digital skills. (ICT 2019a, 10) 
Even in a highly developed country such as Germany, these skills are often 
lacking; e.g., in Germany in 2016, while most people were well aware what 
“apps” meant, only half of the population had a concept of what a “cloud” or 
“cookie” might be. Other concepts like “industry for zero shared economy,” 
“internet of things,” “wearables,” and “big data” were known by less than 20% 
of population and concepts like “smart meters” and “eHealth” by even less than 
10% of the population. Other concepts not listed here were also not so much 
known by the general population. All in all, if one asks specifically what kind 
of knowledge people had, one realises that basic ICT skills do not suffice but 
instead, you need to know a lot of things when using the internet (competent-
ly). Knowledge varies highly concerning not only basic concepts but also con-
cerning skills such as: How to transfer data between devices, how to get infor-
mation in the internet? How to search for information using several data 
sources or even not only looking at the hits on the first page? How to transfer 
money online? How to use cloud appliances? How to set content into the set-
tings (e.g., in social networks how to use netiquette)? How to write texts, do 
calculations, presentations, and use web appliances or even how to do pro-
gramming on the computer? How to do installations both of devices and the 
network and if one is competent to do others? All these knowledge types are 
important to be a competent user of the internet and, again, this knowledge is 
socially structured along the lines of gender, age, and education (Initiative D21 
2016). 
Even if people are knowledgeable about using the internet, there might be 
other reasons why they cannot use the internet. One issue would be that differ-
ent governments use the internet for surveillance or actually for controlling 
content and knowledge offered by the internet. For example, according to the 
Web-Index 2014 (WWWF 2016), between 2013 and 2014, government re-
quests for using data has increased by 78% on Twitter, 76% in Yahoo, 30% in 
Facebook, and 40% on Google. Again, some people might take legal safe 
courts against surveillance, and these legal cases have in fact increased in re-
cent years. However, this is only an option in democratic countries. In many 
countries, governments use different measures to restrict access to the internet. 
According to the latest “Freedom on the Net Report,” 71% of internet users live 
in countries where they might face arrest or imprisonment for posting content 
on religious or political content (Freedom House 2019, 1ff.). 
Depending on the country, not only is it possible that the government might 
deny people access to the internet, but people may choose not to use the inter-
net out of fear that they could be surveyed by their government.  This is espe-
cially an issue in countries with a strong history of government surveillance 
and dictatorships. A good example is Germany, which had, both during Na-
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tional Socialism and in East Germany during the Socialist era, a strong history 
of surveillance. This is reflected in current patterns of internet usage: Many 
Germans are concerned about security when using the internet and thus try not 
to put any personal data on the internet. They regularly change passwords and 
update anti-viral software all while being aware that appliances and apps will 
collect and reveal data (to companies or governments). Some people are also 
concerned about where the data servers are hosted (Initiative D21 2016). Now 
this might result in different types of reactions: If people are competent, they 
might take special measures in order to secure their data. For example, in most 
social media, one can disable many standard activities and thus stay mostly 
anonymous, if one knows how to do this. However, an alternative way of han-
dling this issue is by just simply not using social media. This becomes an issue, 
if a digital service becomes a standard, thus forcing a person to actually use 
this, regardless of whether they want to or not. 
Even if people have no concerns about data privacy, possess the knowledge 
to use the internet, and have access to it, they still need to want to use the inter-
net. In general, people will only use technologies (including the internet) if they 
find using them helpful in their everyday life – if they do not find them helpful, 
why should they spend time and money on the technology? Data available for 
Germany reveal why people might or might not want to use the internet: In 
2016, only a third of the German population believed that the internet helps 
people to stay in contact with other people and also helps being more flexible 
in keeping up a good work-life balance. In contrast, 26% of the population 
believed that if there would not be internet tomorrow it would not have any 
negative consequences on their lives – for lower-income groups, the rate was 
even 40%. Only about a third of the German population sometimes use the 
internet longer than they originally wanted to, while one in four persons actual-
ly plan to stay consciously offline for longer in the future. Only one in five 
persons is interested in the new trends in the digital world. In addition to lack 
of positive incentives for using the internet, there might also be negative side-
effects of using the internet, such as becoming a victim of cyber-bullying or 
other social hardships. However, in 2016, this was only a problem for 8% of 
the German population. More importantly, there might be a lot of people, who 
do not see any additional benefit for their daily life in using the internet, and 
this again depends on the user type (Initiative D21 2016). All these might be 
reasons for staying offline. This might all be changing now in the course of the 
Corona crisis where the internet might be the only way of staying in contact 
with persons one cannot meet face-to-face. 
However, a further issue for not using the internet might actually be the 
costs of using the internet. In this context, concerning mobile broadband costs, 
when they are adjusted by GNI per capita, one finds that it is not the richest 
countries, but actually the poorest, that have the highest internet costs, with 
internet being most expensive in Africa (WWWF 2016, ICT 2019a, 11, see 
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also Graph 2); this is why decreasing the cost of internet access has become a 
World Development Goal (ICT 2019a, 11). 
Graph 2: Costs of (Fast) Internet (2019): Bundled Mobile Broadband Prices, 
PPP$, 2019 
 
Source: ICT 2019a, 11. Note: Simple averages, based on the economies for which data on 
mobile-broadband prices were available. High usage refers to a bundle including 140 minutes 
of voice, 70 SMS, and 1.5 GB of data. Low usage refers to a bundle including 70 minutes of 
voice, 20 SMS, and 500 MB of data. 
 
Looking at the global data, in many ways postcolonial structures are replicated 
in the internet, meaning that the poorer and less developed a country and the 
weaker the state infrastructure, the more difficult it is for its residents to get 
free access to information. This also means that residents of these countries 
hardly leave any digital traces, which is why big data are not a suitable source 
of information for these countries. 
However, the overall pattern of digital use on a global scale is not that clear, 
and it is not only income and GNP alone that influence access to the internet. In 
contrast, governments do strongly influence internet usage by internet policies. 
For example, Kirchner and Wolf (2015) show that in Europe, between early 
1990 and 2010, the digitalization paths were strongly structured by welfare 
regimes. The concept of welfare regimes argues that specific welfare states 
have specific institutional structures, which both are deeply grounded in history 
and at the same time linked to concepts of equality and freedom. This also 
results in how, and what kind of, welfare provisions are provided as well as to 
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what extent. For Western Europe, one can distinguish (a) a Liberal or Anglo-
Saxon, (b) a Social-Democratic or a Scandinavian, (c) a Conservative or Conti-
nental, and (d) a Southern-European Model. Kirchner and Wolf (2015) show 
that the Scandinavian countries were actually the most successful in promoting 
digitalization in the general population, and the Southern-European countries 
were the least successful. In the Scandinavian countries in 2010, 80% of the 
population were actually at least using computers and were on the internet, 
while in Southern-European countries just a little over half of the population 
were. Also interestingly, while the liberal countries had a strong head start, 
internet usage has stagnated since the mid-1990s. A similar pattern can be 
found when one distinguishes between basic uses and intensive uses. For basic 
uses, one can see again the Scandinavian countries have the highest percentage 
of basic uses, which is about 40% of the population, while with the other coun-
tries it is less than 25% of the population. In contrast to the liberal countries, 
Scandinavian and Continental European countries have very high rates of in-
tensive uses, while here the Mediterranean countries lag behind. Kirchner and 
Wolf (2015) use more advanced analyses to conclude that government policies 
might actually shape the way of digitalization and in fact therefore influence 
what kind of data are used. 
This does not only hold true for welfare states, but also for colonial struc-
tures. For example, if one looks on a worldwide scale (WWWF 2016) on the 
uses per population and compares them with the internet penetration per capita, 
one can see that the Western countries of the Global North have the highest 
internet usage of the world, while the countries of the Global South have very 
low rates of usage of the internet. 
4.3 Digital Divides within the Internet 
In addition to complete non-usage, it is important to know how the persons 
who are online use the internet because not everybody uses the internet in the 
same way – and thus does not leave the same type of digital traces. This in turn 
will mean that specific digital platforms will also only grasp very specific as-
pects of social reality. 
First, not everybody uses all kinds of technology. While some people might 
use smartphones and mobile apps, others might use wearables, and others 
might still use their desktop computers and so on. There is also a difference 
between people using multiple devices or a single one. In addition, which is 
rarely reflected in methodological discourse, there might be issues like having 
several smartphones, sharing a smartphone, and so on. 
Secondly, there might be different reasons for usage, the most important 
ones being people using the internet for work or during their leisure time. Dur-
ing work, usage patterns strongly differ between occupations and strata of the 
population (Kirchner 2015). 
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If people do not use the internet for work, but during their leisure time, there 
are also many ways for using the internet. For example, one might use the 
internet for gathering information, which in Germany in 2016, 17% of the 
population did, or simply for fun. Only one in five persons would use the inter-
net for learning, e.g., languages with the help of online courses. Another way of 
using the internet is for communication, but again the usage is widely overes-
timated. In 2016 in Germany, about three in five people used the internet for 
instant messaging like WhatsApp, but this is especially true for the population 
below 60; in the population 60+, it was only one in three persons. Only two in 
five persons would actually use social networks such as Facebook, Xing, and 
Google+. One in five persons would use cloud services, like Dropbox and 
Google Drive, or forums, blogs, and websites, meaning both asking and an-
swering questions there. Only about 13% of the population use devices like 
Google Docs and Microsoft SharePoint, in order to share information with 
other people (Initiative D21 2016). 
Another way of usage is for collecting data in the sense of quantification 
(Mau 2017) in order to better control one’s life (for example, counting steps 
and calories to collect data for oneself, which only one in ten persons would do, 
or using smartphone appliances like intelligent heat control at home, which 
only one in twenty persons would do, or even using eHealth to exchange health 
and fitness data, which again only one in twenty persons would do). Therefore, 
the typical data associated with wearables in the smart home are not only cur-
rently a tiny part of the general population, but they are also especially used by 
the higher income strata, and typically by men, hinting this might not only be 
an issue of money and knowledge but also of wanting to use them, because 
these imply a degree of self-control of one’s everyday life by the internet, 
which a lot of people might not want. 
Another possibility of using the internet is digital commerce, which is also 
strongly overestimated: In 2016, only about half of the German population used 
online shopping; only two in five persons used online services like booking 
holidays, car sharing, and so on. Only one in four persons used demand stream-
ing services like Spotify, Netflix, and Amazon, and only one in five persons 
sold anything via the internet (Initiative D21 2016).  
5.  Aim and Content of this Forum 
To sum up, big data need not be digital data, and the boundary between tradi-
tional-type and new-type big data is very fluent. While sometimes in methodo-
logical discourses, traditional-type and new-type big data seem to be complete-
ly different types of data, in research practice, their boundaries are fluent: Not 
only research data centres, but also historical data archives and a large number 
of university projects are working on making both types of data (i.e., previous-
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ly untapped old data collections as well as new digital data) increasingly acces-
sible for research. This is expanding the possibilities for the social sciences to 
analyse social phenomena from both a current and historical perspective. These 
possibilities increase even further, when data sets are linked or fused (Cielebak 
and Rässler 2019), and big data are combined with each other and/or with 
research-induced data such as survey data, qualitative interviews, or ethnogra-
phy, resulting in mixed-mode or mixed-methods data analysis.  
At the same time, the power of new-type big data should not be overesti-
mated, as only about half the world population is using the internet and thus 
leaving digital traces, and exclusion from the internet is strongly structured 
along lines of social and spatial inequality. The inequalities on a global scale 
show that there are many reasons for keeping people from using the internet, 
and so today, we are far away from saying that the internet grasps the complete 
social area of reality. Like any process-generated data, digital data are distorted 
and can by no means substitute per se for other data. This does not mean that 
digital data cannot be used for social science research, but instead means that 
digital data are just like other data: They might be useful for some questions 
but not useful for others. In order to find out which types of people and situa-
tions one can actually analyse by using digital data, one should rather ask 
“Who is excluded from the internet and why?” and “What do we already know 
about digital divides?” 
However, currently, there is a strange and unfruitful contradiction between 
research practice and the possibilities of handling big data and methodological 
discourse on big data, which is a barrier to asking these questions. This contra-
diction is increased by a division within the methodological community: 
1) Social science methodology focusses its discussion on research-elicited 
and traditional-type big data and stresses that these data are socially con-
structed and each have their own methodical problems. As we have 
shown in this paper, this debate is not new but – at least for German-
language sociology – is almost 150 years old and was a main reason for 
founding sociology as a discipline. This long-lasting debate has revealed 
the specific strengths and weaknesses of both big data and research-
elicited data and also resulted in recommendations on how to handle each 
data type. 
2) Computational social sciences primarily focus on new-type big data. In 
methodological research, computational social sciences are increasingly 
turning to new analysis techniques and algorithms for evaluating big da-
ta. Here, too, a debate on methods is emerging, which primarily address-
es pragmatic feasibility problems as well as structuring through technol-
ogy.  
So while one line of discourse mostly focusses on data quality, the other one 
mostly focusses on data analysis. Both these research lines are hardly connect-
ed, and both have mutual blind spots. This HSR Forum therefore aims at dis-
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cussing how these research lines can complement each other and can be im-
proved by using the findings of each other. For example, the potentials of new 
analysis procedures and algorithms of computational science are promising 
also for analysing traditional-type big data. On the other hand, critically reflect-
ing on possible errors and distortions of new-type big data is necessary to con-
sider because data quality will strongly influence results. A critical examination 
of the erroneousness and internal distortion of new-type big data seems more 
than necessary. 
This HSR Forum aims at contributing to such an exchange and at reflecting 
on the conditions under which big data are created as well as discussing the 
challenges of using them. This includes the question of whether and how the 
concept of “data science” needs to be expanded or updated. Thus, in addition to 
measurement-related characteristics, social, political, and economic conditions 
come into consideration, which make the interpretation of analysis results 
meaningful. The Forum also wants to pose these methodological and theoreti-
cal questions with the intention of pointing out possibilities for increasing the 
significance of big data analyses in social science studies.  
Peter Graeff and Nina Baur start the discussion by applying the concept of 
“data lore” to three data types about corruption: research-elicited data (such as 
survey data), traditional-type big data, and new-type big data. When these 
different data sources about corruption are compared with each other according 
to their quality, the immediate question arises as to which is the best one for 
measuring corruption and answering questions about this topic. Since data 
quality is necessarily connected to the amount and types of errors within the 
data, classical ideas about public administrative and survey data are applicable 
for answering this question. Graeff and Baur pick up the so-called “Bick-
Mueller-Model” (Bick and Müller 1984) that was developed in the 1980s in 
order to regard the special features and particularities of administrative mass 
data. They show how and why errors can occur within the administrative pro-
cess of registering corruption data and juxtapose those in opposition to errors 
which belong to research-elicited data. They also describe new trends in data 
generation and application and show the progress made since Bick and Müller 
(1984) introduced their model and discuss new features of digitalism and new 
technologies with particular reference to the new-type big data. One of their 
conclusions is that the question about the “best” data cannot be answered ac-
cording to their quality features. They exemplify this by referring to corruption 
data. No data source or data type measures corruption directly and all data are 
flawed in some way (such as a lack in population coverage or generalizability). 
However, data from different sources could be – sometimes – combined in 
order to answer specific research questions. From this point of view, new-type 
big data have the advantage of complementing other equally flawed data 
sources – they reveal their strength in triangulation with these other data 
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sources. However, fruitful triangulation is only possible if researchers are 
aware of the specific advantages and disadvantages of using specific data types. 
In the second paper, Gertraud Koch and Katharina Kinder-Kurlanda argue 
that “source criticism” (which resembles the concept of “data lore” introduced 
by Graeff and Baur) is as an epistemological practice in social and cultural 
studies, which is crucial for specifying the range and scope of the findings, or 
in other words, their validity and reliability. In the context of big data, source 
criticism is not yet established in the fashion as it is known in other areas of 
social and cultural research. Currently emerging discussions in historical re-
search emphasize the relevance of source criticism of digital objects respective 
data. In the context of these discussions, Koch and Kinder-Kurlanda suggest 
exploring the potentials of source criticism for platform logics. They focus on 
big data sourced from the internet. Nevertheless, their results aim at being 
transferrable to other sources of big data. The inclusion of source criticism into 
big data analysis may in turn foster the integration of data-driven analyses into 
social and cultural studies research approaches. For an integration of source 
criticism, Koch and Kinder-Kurlanda propose source critical analyses of infor-
mation systems respective internet platforms in big data analysis with regard to 
(a) types of big data platforms, (b) researchers as data producers, and (c) mixed 
realities of platform usage practices. In analogy to source repertoires (Quellen-
typen), Koch and Kinder-Kurlanda suggest classifying internet platforms as 
providers of particular types of big data sources depending on their infrastruc-
tural materiality and ontologies for tracing the key issues of (external) source 
criticism: provenance, authenticity, and integrity. 
In the third contribution, Martin Weichbold, Alexander Seymer, Wolfgang 
Aschauer, and Thomas Herdin highlight the potentials and limits of big-data 
analyses of media sources compared to conventional, quantitative content anal-
ysis: In an multidisciplinary project in Austria (based on the KIRAS security 
research program), the software tool WebLyzard was used for an automated 
analysis of online news and social media sources (comments on articles, Face-
book postings, and Twitter statements) in order to analyse the media represen-
tation of pressing societal issues and citizens’ perceptions of security. Frequen-
cy and sentiment analyses were carried out by two independent observers in 
parallel to the automated WebLyzard results. Specific articles on selected key 
topics like technology or Muslims in two major online newspapers in Austria 
(Der Standard and Kronen Zeitung) were counted, as were user comments, and 
both were evaluated according to different sentiment categories. The results 
indicate various weaknesses of the software leading to misinterpretations, and 
the automated analyses yield substantially different results compared to the 
sentiment analysis carried out by the two raters, especially for cynical or irrele-
vant statements. From a social science methodology perspective, the results 
clearly show that methodology needs to promote theory-based research, should 
counteract the attraction of superficial analyses of complex social issues, and 
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should emphasize not only the potentials but also the dangers and risks associ-
ated with big data. 
In their contribution, Rainer Diaz-Bone, Kenneth Horvarth, and Valeska 
Cappel argue that the phenomenon of big data does not only deeply affect 
current societies but also poses crucial challenges to social research. The au-
thors argue for moving towards a sociology of social research in order to char-
acterize the new qualities of big data and their deficiencies. They draw on the 
neopragmatist approach of economics of convention (EC) as a conceptual basis 
for such a sociological perspective. This framework suggests investigating 
processes of quantification in their interplay with orders of justifications and 
logics of evaluation. Accordingly, methodological issues such as the question 
of the “quality of big data” must be discussed in their deep entanglement with 
epistemic values, institutional forms, and historical contexts and as necessarily 
implying political issues such as who controls and has access to data infrastruc-
tures. Using this conceptual basis, the paper uses the example of health to dis-
cuss the challenges of big data analysis for social research. Phenomena such as 
the rise of new and massive privately owned data infrastructures, the economic 
valuation of huge amounts of connected data, or the movement of “quantified 
self” are presented as indications of a profound transformation compared to 
established forms of doing social research. Methodological, epistemological, 
but also institutional and political strategies are presented to face the risk of 
being “outperformed” and “replaced” by big data analysis as they are already 
done in big US American and Chinese Internet enterprises. In conclusion, the 
authors argue that the sketched developments have important implications both 
for research practices and methods teaching in the era of big data. 
Michael Weinhardt concludes the focus with his contribution on the “Ethical 
Issues in the Use of Big Data for Social Research.” He argues that with the 
advent of big data, vast amounts of data have become available. This happens 
faster than the development of according ethical and legal standards for the 
analysis of this type of data. Weinhardt highlights that researchers face moral 
dilemmas concerning privacy and autonomy and asks which ethical and legal 
aspects need to be considered when collecting and analysing data from the 
web. In order to answer these questions, the paper provides an overview over 
existing research ethic regulations like the right to be protected from harmful 
conduct and specific laws like the EU-GDPR, which came into effect in May 
2018. Weinhardt then points out different ethical problems that arise when 
collecting big data. For example, in order to link different data sources, indi-
viduals have to be identifiable. Weinhardt concludes with a set of recommenda-
tions (e.g., using a risk benefit analysis or the development of ethical guide-
lines) that are aiming to stimulate further scientific discussion. 
All in all, from a methodological point of view, all the critique of tradition-
al-type big data applies to digital data and all the knowledge accumulated for 
analysing these data applies for digital data as well. This in turn means that the 
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social sciences have already explicit knowledge on how to handle these data 
methodologically. Still new-type big data are not the same as traditional-type 
big data, because they have some extra properties, but these are not the ones 
that are typically discussed in the big data discourse. An important new aspect 
of digital data is velocity, meaning the high speed with which data are generat-
ed, transferred, and linked. In addition, what is relatively new, but which could 
also be applied to classical process-generated data, are new analysis techniques 
like text mining. Another important aspect to be discussed is the shift in the 
balance of power (Machtbalance) between the state, companies, and citi-
zen/customers. 
So what are the questions we should ask for future research? We should ask 
first, how do the shifts in balances of power, both from transferring data own-
ership from the state to companies as well as the increasing willingness of 
people to provide data, inflect in data quality? Second, if one agrees that there 
are different types of data within the internet, how do different types of data in 
the internet differ in data quality and how do these data differ from classical 
process-produced data such as public administrative data, media data, and 
company data and how do they differ from research elicited data? How can one 
use the classical tools of social science methodology for assessing data quality 
in big data and how do they have to be modified? If one assumes, that all data 
have some types of distortions, which types of data are suitable for which types 
of questions? Finally, how can these data be analysed? This means, firstly, how 
can we use techniques like text mining for analysing these data, but also, sec-
ondly, how can we use other classical methods of social science data analysis 
for analysing digital data? Things that come to mind are new methods like 
“webnography” or the “sociology of knowledge approach to discourse.” 
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